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ABSTRACT
GRAPH TECHNIQUE FOR METAMORPHIC VIRUS DETECTION
by Neha Runwal
Current anti-virus techniques include signature based detection, anomaly based detection,
and machine learning based virus detection. Signature detection is the most widely used
approach. Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure with each infection.
Metamorphism provides one of the strong known methods for evading malware
detection.

In this project, we consider metamorphic virus detection based on a directed graph
obtained from executable files. We compare our detection results with a previously
developed and highly successful technique based on hidden Markov models.
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1. Introduction
Malicious softwares are concerns for many organizations [25]. Various reports were
created and analyzed to find total loss occurred due to malicious softwares. According to
[24] [25], overall effect of damages ranges from US$ 13.2 billion to US$ 67.2 billion for
US business alone. A report [26] has a list of top ten malicious software profiles of 2006
where Mytob, Sdbot, and Netsky were ranked in first three. There are various techniques
available for virus detection. But with each improvement in detection, virus writers
attempt to improve their virus implementations so as to evade detection [1].

According to an analysis discussed in [25], it is revealed that on average, only 48.16% of
malware was detected by popular antivirus programs. Recent common types of malware
include Trojans, worms, and polymorphic viruses [2]. Although not yet common,
metamorphic viruses could present the most difficult detection challenge to date. In
metamorphic viruses, virus writers do not have to explicitly write different undetectable
viruses. They just have to create one virus and then use morph engines [12] to create its
copies which will have similar functionality but different body structures [3].

We have analyzed a graph based malware detection technique proposed in [4]. Our
technique is inspired by the approach followed in [4]. As in [4], we create weighted
directed graphs based on instruction counts and then directly compare the resultant
graphs to compare the similarity of executable files. Our approach differs significantly
from [4] in a way that we use a much simpler method for comparing the graphs.
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Following sections provide detailed information about the proposed graph technique and
related analysis.
•

Section 2 introduces different types of malicious software and detection
techniques.

•

Section 3 discusses Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and virus detection based on
HMM.

•

Section 4 explains the implementation details of graph based metamorphic virus
detection.

•

Section 5 shows various test cases and their analysis.

•

Section 6 deals with detailed observations of all test cases discussed in section 5.

•

Section 7 analyses graph technique and its features.

•

Section 8 contains information about attacks carried out on the graph technique.

•

Section 9 concludes about the proposed graph technique.

•

Section 10 discusses future work related to the graph technique.

2. Malware and detection techniques
Malware is nothing but a program developed to perform malicious activities on a
computer. These activities could harm the computer data or could simply be intended as a
prank. Malware can be a source of revenue for a malware writer. Hence there are
different intentions behind different types of malware. If a computer is infected with any
type of malware, then the malware needs to be caught and removed to avoid any loss.
This can be done using anti-virus softwares.
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2.1 Types of malware
Malicious software, commonly known as malware, tends to affect more than one
computer at an instance. Some malware are downloaded unknowingly and executed
without appropriate permissions. Following are a few types of malware.

2.1.1 Viruses
Initially, viruses were created to stay in the boot sectors of floppy disks so that whenever
an infected system is booted, that virus will also get executed [28]. The executables of
viruses need human interaction to get spread onto other computers [25]. If a user uses an
external drive to copy some data which is already infected by such viruses, then that host
system will also get infected. “Viruses have ability to reproduce themselves infecting
other files and programs” [27].

2.1.1.1 Polymorphic viruses
These types of viruses are encrypted and spread along with their decryptor body and an
encrypted mutation engine [29]. The base virus remains as it is, only the decryptor body
changes. Once these viruses are copied or downloaded, the decryptor body decrypts the
virus and the mutation engine, to infect the host machine. The mutation engine creates
randomized decryptor body and attaches it to the newly encrypted virus body with the
new key on each infection [29]. So on every new infection, a new decryptor and virus
body is generated. Heuristic analysis using sandbox can be used to detect polymorphic
viruses [30].
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2.1.1.2 Metamorphic viruses
Metamorphic viruses are different than polymorphic viruses. Metamorphic virus does not
carry a decryptor or encrypted virus body [31]. “Main goal of metamorphism is to change
the appearance of the virus while keeping its functionality” [3]. Figure 1 shows different
generations of a metamorphic virus where the shape changes but the functionality
remains the same.

Figure 1: Metamorphic virus generations [32]
Body structure of a metamorphic virus changes its shape from generation to generation.
This is done using metamorphic engine. The anatomy of a metamorphic engine is showed
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in Figure 2. There are different modules like locate own code, decode, analyze,
transform, and attach.

Figure 2: Anatomy of a metamorphic engine [33]
As stated in [33] [3], Locate own code module is used to find own code. Decode module
provides the virus decode information which is needed in transformation process.
Analyze module is used to construct register liveliness. Transform module transforms the
code into some other equivalent code. Finally, attach module is used to bind the newly
created virus file with a new host program or file [3].

In transform module, virus copies are transformed using techniques like register
swapping, code obfuscation, transposition, and subroutine permutation [3]. Examples of
metamorphic engines are Next Generation Virus Construction Kit (NGVCK),
Phalcon/Skism Mass-Produced Code generator (PS-MPC), Second Generation virus
generator (G2), Mass Code Generator (MPCGEN) [34]. According to [6], NGVCK is
more effective in creating metamorphic viruses with different generations but keeping the
exact functionality similar to the base virus.
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2.1.2 Trojans
Trojan horse is a malicious program which gets stored on the host machine by luring the
user as it is a benign software or a file [14]. When user clicks on a link or email
attachments or downloads a file which looks familiar to user, Trojan horse gets stored
and executed without the knowledge of the user or the administrator.
The purpose of a Trojan horse could be to get remote access, download and execute
malware or to steal information from the infected system [14]. Trojans do not reproduce
or self-replicate like viruses or worms [27].

2.1.3 Worms
Worm is a program that replicates itself over the internet or computer networks and it is
done without any human intervention [15] [27]. Worm is a macro residing in a word or
excel document that spreads itself across the network. This document travels from one
computer to another infecting all intermediate systems [15].
Worms saturate the network and collapse it by reproducing itself. Some worms sent via
emails include: Navidad, Pretty Park, Happy99 etc [27].

2.2 Detection techniques
As there are different types of malware, there are many types of detection techniques
available. Most common and fast technique is signature based detection. Second
technique is anomaly based detection which is good in detecting new malware. But these
techniques have inadequacies to detect each and every malware [16]. Next subsections
discuss these detection techniques in detail.
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2.2.1 Signature based detection
Signature based detection is popular due to its simplicity, faster detection, and less false
positives [35]. This technique looks for specific signature, a sequence of specific opcodes
in a file to detect and classify it as a benign or virus file. It uses signature dictionary or
database to compare with existing virus signatures [36]. Although it seems much easier to
implement, it is not effective in case of new malware since the signatures for new
malware will not be present in the database. Hence, this technique keeps on updating its
database for up-to-date virus detections. Also, this detection technique can easily be
defeated by simple code obfuscation techniques used to change the signature of the
malware [35].

2.2.2 Anomaly based detection
This technique is efficient in detecting zero-day malware [16] as compared to signature
based detection technique. There are two phases in anomaly based detection, training and
detection [16]. During training phase the scanner learns about normal as well as
malicious behavior. Malicious behavior means a behavior which changes or accesses the
system data without the authoritative permissions. Once the scanner is trained, it is used
to detect such malicious activities and take the appropriate actions [16]. But it has its own
disadvantages. This technique has more false positives or negatives as compared to other
detection techniques and secondly it is more complex and costlier [16].

2.2.3 HMM based detection
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based virus detection is a new technique as compared to
above two techniques. HMM works as a state machine [6]. It helps in finding probability
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of transition from one state to another. Once the HMM is trained, it can be used to detect
or differentiate between malware and benign software. It is discussed in more detail in
later sections.

3. Hidden Markov Models
There has been a lot of work done on Hidden Markov Model (HMM) for virus detection
[17][6]. A threshold represents a value or a range where scores of benign software and
malware do not overlap. Using such threshold, benign files and virus files can be
distinguished. Technique in [6] was quite successful in finding the threshold to
distinguish between malware and benign software. This section concentrates on HMM,
its features, HMM for plain text, and HMM for virus detection.

3.1 Introduction to HMM
“Hidden Markov Model is based on pattern analysis” [35] and used to find the state
transition probabilities. It is mainly used in language recognition [17], speech recognition
[18], and now in virus detection [6]. Here HMM is thoroughly experimented and
analyzed for plain English text pattern to understand its working. A pattern or structure of
the software is a sequence in which instructions are written and a way the program flows.
Malware also has different structures as compared to benign software structures. In this
paper, we will also compare HMM based virus detection with newly proposed graph
technique.
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3.2 Main features of HMM
HMM for plain English text [17] is so effective that after executing it for an observation
string of 50000 characters, it distinguishes vowels and consonants in two states.
Before analyzing HMM, following are the notations used in HMM.
“T = the length of the observation sequence
N = the number of states in the model
M = the number of observation symbols
Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qN−1} = the states of the Markov process
V = {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1} = set of possible observations
A = the state transition probabilities
B = the observation probability matrix

π = the initial state distribution
O = (O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1) = observation sequence.” [17]
Here A, B and π are row stochastic which means every element in a row sums to 1.
Figure 3 shows a generic HMM where Oi are observations, Xi are hidden states, A shows
state transition probabilities, and B is an observation probability matrix.

Figure 3: Generic Hidden Markov Model [17]
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The English plain text is taken from “Brown Corpus” [37] which has around 1,000,000
words. In this experiment, we have removed all special symbols and considered in total
27 symbols containing all 26 alphabets and space. For English plain text, we considered
value of N as 2 and M as 27 (26 alphabets + space). Consider T= 50000 observations. At
start, each element in π and A are initialized to approximately 1/2 and B matrix is
initialized to 1/27 [17].

π = [0.51316 0.48684]
0.47468 0.52532
A= 

0.51656 0.48344
Once the initialization is done, next step is to train the model. After 500 iterations, we get
trained π , A, and B matrices and logarithmic probability. Depending upon this
logarithmic probability, threshold is decided. Here the probability threshold is noted after
the model is trained for Brown Corpus plain text. Following is a brief algorithm for
HMM.
a. Every matrix (A, B, and π ) is row stochastic
b. Iteration contains forward and backward passes to train the model [17].
c. It can be run for any number of iterations (no space complexity issue).
d. Using final values of all matrices, logarithmic probability is calculated.
e. Similarity between two texts is calculated by comparing their probabilities got
from the trained models.
It is observed that, bigger the observation string, stronger is the trained model. In table 1,
all matrices and final probability value are shown.

10

Observations for English text
Matrix Pi
0.00000 1.00000
Final Matrix A
0.25633 0.74367
0.71195 0.28805

Final Matrix B
a
0.13956
b
0.00000
c
0.00000
d
0.00000
e
0.21460
f
0.00000
g
0.00016
h
0.00000
i
0.12308
j
0.00000
k
0.00177
l
0.00000
m
0.00000
n
0.00000
o
0.13184
p
0.00000
q
0.00000
r
0.00000
s
0.00000
t
0.00971
u
0.04514
v
0.00000
w
0.00000
x
0.00000
y
0.00000
z
0.00000
space
0.33413
log [P(observations | lambda)]

0.00000
0.02306
0.05661
0.06925
0.00000
0.03547
0.02780
0.07321
0.00000
0.00364
0.00708
0.07258
0.03880
0.11439
0.00000
0.03703
0.00153
0.10202
0.11024
0.14483
0.00000
0.01617
0.02298
0.00446
0.02599
0.00110
0.01178

= -137300.054917
Table 1: Final trained HMM for English Text
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Matrix B is N x M i.e. it has 2 rows and 27 columns. Matrix B is shown vertical for
simplicity. Two rows in matrix B represent two states. Here first row has higher values
for all vowels and zero or smaller values for consonants. In the second row, vowels have
zero values and consonants have larger values. Matrix B in table 1 shows the separation
of consonants and vowels in two hidden states. This shows that HMM is able to detect
the English language pattern.

Next step is to check whether HMM is able to distinguish between English texts and
other texts. For this check, HMM was tested against some other language text. Text for
this experiment is collected from Hindi language. Table 2 shows values of all matrices
for non-English language text.
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Observations from other texts
Matrix Pi
0.91991 0.08009

Final Matrix A
0.48633 0.51367
0.4912 0.5088
Final Matrix B
0.04297
A
0.04451
B
0.08326
0.08377
C
0.04328
0.04313
D
0.04029
0.04035
E
0.04614
0.04603
F
0.0459
0.04626
G
0.04887
0.04904
H
0.05464
0.0548
I
0.06322
0.0635
J
0.03252
0.03244
K
0.02737
0.02735
L
0.00000
0.00000
M
0.03028
0.03021
N
0.02731
0.02741
O
0.02733
0.02739
P
0.02587
0.02597
Q
0.03171
0.03165
R
0.03166
0.0317
S
0.03166
0.0317
T
0.03456
0.03456
U
0.03161
0.03175
V
0.03315
0.03309
W
0.03023
0.03025
X
0.03448
0.03464
Y
0.04027
0.04037
Z
0.04615
0.04602
space
0.01373
0.01367
log [P(observations | lambda)] = -160022.815487
Table 2: Final trained HMM for other texts
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In table 2, matrix B does not distinguish between vowels or consonants as it is not an
English text. Also table 3 shows that there are different logarithmic probabilities of
English text and other text.
Logarithmic probability for English Text
-137300.054917

Logarithmic probability for other text
-160022.815487

Table 3: Comparison of logarithmic probabilities
HMM easily distinguishes between English and other texts. All related observations are
discussed in more detail in the next section.

3.2.1 HMM observations
Hidden Markov Model testing is carried out for 200 to 500 iterations for English text and
other text. This section summarizes the changes in matrices A, B, and π . At the end,
matrix A had similar distribution of numbers in both the states for plain English texts.
Matrix A had row values ranging from 0.19 to 0.808 and 0.69 to 0.302. Matrix A and B
varied with plain English texts observation sequences and with number of iterations.

1. At the end of all the iterations, all vowels {A,E,I,O,U} had higher values in state one
along with very small values for C,G,K,L,P,T and Y in state one. But in state two all
these vowels had zeros (0) and other characters had bigger values which had zeros or
very small values in state one. After increasing the number of iterations to 500 and later
to 1000, small values were changed to zero. Hence training a model may require more
number of iterations.
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2. The final logarithmic probability was similar in case of plain English text. Parameters
such as number of iterations or seed value were affecting the final value of the
probability though not making significant difference to B matrix.
3. "Space" had similar distribution in both the states throughout the HMM.

3.2.2 Limitations of HMM
Though HMM is able to detect English text pattern, there are still few limitations over
HMM which could affect its efficiency. Few factors like observations, observation
length, and number of iterations do affect the trained matrices values and logarithmic
probability. Following are some HMM limitations based on above factors.
1. If the observation sequence is small then the final probability value changes
drastically as compared to the probability of the observation sequence with 50,000
characters even though both are plain English texts.
2. When the seed value was changed, the probability value was also changed.
3. HMM mainly depends upon the total count of characters present in the
observation sequence. So if all the characters are evenly distributed then HMM
does not give appropriate probability value.
4. HMM shows different values for the final trained model and probability for the
same observation string due to variations in input values of observation string
length, seed number, and iterations.
From above limitations, it seems that observation sequence, its length, iterations, and
seed value affect HMM results and logarithmic probability. To avoid these problems, we
can consider constant values for few factors like iterations and seed value. And before
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comparing HMM results of two texts, observation sequence length should be same to
compare results and probabilities adequately.

3.3 HMM based virus detection
In [6], an effective virus detection scheme based on HMMs is developed and analyzed.
There were many test cases executed to check the effectiveness of HMM based detection.
Datasets consisted different virus files, CYGWIN files, and NGVCK metamorphic virus
files belonging to IDAN virus family. It is proven that NGVCK creates varied morphed
copies maintaining the existing functionality of the base virus [6]. Figure 4 shows the
graph of the NGVCK virus pair with highest similarity score of 21%.

Figure 4: Similarity graphs of the NGVCK pair
After creating the variants using NGVCK, the HMM was trained. In [6], a five fold cross
validation technique is used to train the HMM. In this, the whole dataset is divided into 5
subsets. For training purpose, 4 datasets are used and the fifth subset is used to test the
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trained HMM model. This process is repeated for 5 times. At the end of the experiment, it
was observed that HMM had higher probabilities for similar virus files and low
probabilities for benign and metamorphic virus files. For 200 metamorphic viruses, 25
models were trained to classify viruses and normal files. HMM was able to detect 23
models out of 25 models and was able to distinguish between viruses and normal files.

HMM based detection was tested against a morphing engine in [7]. For 5% subroutine
code insertion in the metamorphic virus files, scores calculated using HMM based
detection technique showed 3 false positives and 6 false negatives amongst 40 normal
files and 40 metamorphic virus files. When 15% of the subroutine was copied from
normal file to metamorphic virus file and scores were calculated using HMM. There were
26 false negatives and 33 false positives in 40 normal and 40 metamorphic virus files.
And for 30% of the subroutine code insertion, there were 36 false negatives and 35 false
positives which shows that HMM based detection was not able to distinguish between
normal files and metamorphic virus files with 30% of subroutine code insertion.

Above scores show that the morphing engine is very effective in morphing the
metamorphic virus files and is able to defeat the HMM based detection. It is very
important to check our graph technique against this morphing engine as well.
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4. Graph technique for metamorphic virus detection
Next subsection discusses the graph based malware detection technique from [4] along
with our proposed graph technique. Rest subsections will focus on the implementation
details, flow chart, and algorithm of our graph technique.

4.1 Related work
As discussed in paper [6], HMM based virus detection was effective in classifying
metamorphic viruses and benign files. HMM is able to detect NGVCK metamorphic
virus copies with less false positives and negatives. In paper [7], an engine is
implemented to morph copies of metamorphic viruses to make them undetectable by the
HMM. This engine was tested against HMM based detection technique, and engine was
able to defeat the HMM based virus detection. In the HMM based detection, these
morphed metamorphic virus copies were able to evade the detection and increased the
false positive and negative rates.

As proposed in [4], virus detection can be carried out by creating graphs according to the
assembly instructions present in files and comparing those graphs using graph kernel
technique. Graph kernel is used to find the similarity between two graphs. Graph kernel
has a feature φ H for each possible graph H where φ H (G ) measures how many graphs
have the same structure as graph H [38]. In [4], Spectral kernel and Gaussian kernel were
used. Spectral kernel is using graph’s global structure like smoothness, diameter, and
number of components to find the similarity matrix. Gaussian kernel considered local
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structure of the graph where it takes the squared difference between corresponding edges
in weighted adjacency matrices. Once the similarity matrix is constructed using graph
kernels and their combination, Support Vector Machine (SVM) is used for classification.
SVM maximizes the margin where hyperplane can be separated [39]. Critical element is
support vector and for such inputs it identifies in which of the two classes it belongs to.

In paper [4], the test data sets contain different types of viruses. It used 1,615 instances of
malware and 615 instances of benign software. Tests were carried out against this
technique and top five antivirus softwares and results were compared. Results showed
that the combined graph kernels were 96.41% accurate in classifying normal files and
viruses. But there were 47 false positives and 33 false negatives.

Compared to the above technique, our proposed technique differs significantly in finding
the similarity check and in the classification techniques used. In our method, comparison
between the two graphs or matrices is much simpler than the technique proposed in [4].
We will discuss our technique in more detail in further sections.

4.2 Proposed solution
The proposed graph technique includes graph creations based on traces of assembly
language instructions. Mostly viruses are in the form of executable files. We have a set of
disassembled virus and benign files. In this graph technique we are creating an instruction
array to keep track of all instructions present in a file. This array is initialized using an
existing instruction set file. As tracing progresses, this array is appended with new
assembly instructions found in the file. A successive instruction set represents any two
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same or different instructions coming after each other (subsection 4.3 discusses this in
more detail). There is another matrix which is used to store counts of such successive
instruction sets. In this matrix, rows and columns will represent instructions. Before
tracing starts, this whole matrix is initialized to zero. Both the array and the matrix are
updated for each instruction. Assembly file contains a sequence of combinations of
instructions and related operands. Instruction performs defined operations on the
operands or using the operands. Following is an example of an assembly language
instruction with operands.
MOV EAX, 20H
Here “MOV” is an instruction and “EAX” and “20H” are operands. MOV instruction
copies 20H into EAX which is a register. There are more than 130 assembly language
instructions for a particular processor [40]. Operands can be different forms like registers,
memory operands, flags etc. There could be 3000 different combinations of instructions
and different operands [4]. If we create a graph based upon such combinations of
vertices, graph will become too large to compare. Instead we considered only instructions
to represent vertices in the graph. The program ignores comments, variables, and
instruction operands. Once the complete file is traced and matrix is updated, next step is
to repeat this process for another file. For second file, another matrix will be created.
Both the matrices will have same number of rows and columns as both matrices will use
the same array which has list of all distinct instructions present in both the files. This
matrix can be represented as a bi-directed graph. Subsection 4.3 discusses the matrix
operations in more detail. Once both the matrices are ready with respective counts, next
step is to calculate the similarity score between these matrices. This score is calculated
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using a formula shown in equation 1. Last step is to classify whether these files are
similar or different.

4.3 Implementation details
This subsection gives detailed information about the implementation of the technique.
Our technique is based upon assembly language instructions. Every processor has its own
assembly language instruction sets [8]. So if we use specific/fixed set of instructions, then
it might not be possible to compare or differentiate any other assembly language
instruction set. Hence we considered to collect all new instructions while tracing the files.
When any instruction which is not present in the matrix is found, it will get appended at
the end of the matrix and this will increase the length of the matrix and the array. Hence
the length of the matrix is nothing but the total number of distinct instructions found in
the software / malware. As mentioned, this matrix contains counts of successive
instructions. For successive instructions example, consider there is an instruction ADD in
the code segment of the file. If that instructions is present in the matrix, and if it is
preceded by another instruction MOV, then its count in the matrix with the combination
of previous instruction (MOV row) and current instruction (ADD column), will be
increased. For example, Table 4 shows a code segment, based on which, a matrix will be
created. The total number of distinct instructions is 17 and those are listed below. All
distinct instructions will represent an individual node in the graph. All these instructions
push, mov, sub, and, test, jz, int, fnstcw, movzx, or, fldcw, call, leave, retn, align, xor,
and lea will have outgoing and incoming edges representing some numbers which are
counts of those instructions coming after each other.
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Instruction (Operator)
Push
Mov
Sub
And
Mov
Test
Jz
Int
Fnstcw
Movzx
And
Mov
Movzx
Or
Mov
Fldcw
Mov
Call
Leave, Retn, Align
Push
Mov
Mov
Push
Push
Push
Sub
Mov
Mov
And
Call
Call
Mov
Mov
Call
Mov
Xor
Mov
Mov
Mov
Mov
Mov
Call
Mov
Lea

Operand
Ebp
ebp, esp
esp, 8
esp, 0FFFFFFF0h
eax, ds:dword_404000
eax, eax
Short loc_401013
3
[ebp+var_2]
eax, [ebp+var_2]
eax, 0FFFFF0C0h
[ebp+var_2], ax
eax, [ebp+var_2]
eax, 33Fh
[ebp+var_2], ax
[ebp+var_2]
[esp+8+var_8], offset sub_401050
sub_401960
10h
Ebp
eax, 10h
ebp, esp
Edi
Esi
Ebx
esp, 7Ch
edi, [ebp+arg_0]
esi, [ebp+arg_4]
esp, 0FFFFFFF0h
sub_401930
j___main
[ebp+var_4C], 0
[esp+88h+var_88], offset unk_404090
j_CORBA_exception_init
dword ptr [esp+88h+var_84+4], esi
edx, edx
eax, offset off_402000
[esp+88h+var_78], edx
[esp+88h+var_7C], eax
dword ptr [esp+88h+var_84], edi
[esp+88h+var_88], offset aOafClient ; "oaf-client"
j_poptGetContext
ebx, eax
esi, [esi+0]

Table 4: Assembly language instruction traces for graph creation
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After tracing above instructions and finding all the counts, matrix looks like as shown in
Table 5.

Table 5: Matrix created using assembly language instruction counts
In table 5, blank cells represent zeros. Sparse matrix contains more zeros and very less
non-zero values. Thus this matrix becomes a sparse matrix due to less number of nonzero values. Rows in this matrix will represent the nodes and values in that row
correspond to values of the edges going out from that node to other nodes. Now if we
keep all these counts as it is and calculate the difference, then this technique can easily be
defeated. It is because, if we add more and more dead code to the .asm file, it will simply
increase the count and will lead to incorrect score.

In a matrix if each row sums to one, then this matrix is called row stochastic matrix.
To avoid this problem and to find the probability, we decided to make that matrix, row
stochastic. Stochastic matrix is used for non-deterministic or probabilistic calculations
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[9]. By taking sum of a row and dividing each value in that row by that sum makes it row
stochastic. The sparse row stochastic matrix looks like as shown in table 6.

Table 6: Normalized sparse matrix to make it row stochastic
Table 6 shows the probability of transition from one instruction to another instruction.
This way whole successive instruction count is stored in the matrix. Now this matrix can
be represented in a graph format as shown in figure 5.
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Figure 5: Bi-directed graph created using the matrix in Table 6
Reason behind creating a graph is we want to find the probability of one instruction
coming after another or same instruction. After constructing the matrix (graph) for a file,
next step is to create another matrix with the counts of successive instructions present in
other file. We use the Equation 1 to measure the similarity between two files.
i = N −1 j = N −1
1
Difference = 2 * ( ∑ ( ∑ aij − bij ) ) 2
N
i=0
j =0

Equation 1: Formula for calculating similarity score [11]
Threshold will be a range or a value which will be useful in classifying benign file and
virus file. If the score calculated by this formula is lower than the threshold that means
compared files have similar structures in nature. Else if score is higher than the threshold
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that means files are different from each other. In this way technique will find whether a
given file is a malware or benign software.

4.4 Graph technique algorithm
Below is the algorithm to briefly explain the proposed graph technique.
1. Trace assembly language instructions for the first file
2. Initialize an array with most frequent assembly language instructions present in an
“InstSet.txt” file.
2. Create a matrix with memory allocated for all instructions in the above array and
initialize all cells with zero.
3. The matrix will be appended dynamically whenever a new instruction is found
4. While tracing the program, keep counting the number of successive instructions which
are coming after each other. Store this count in the matrix.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until it reaches end of the file.
6. Repeat steps from 1 through 5 for another file.
7. To calculate the similarity score between these two files (matrices), use the formula in
Equation 1.
8. This similarity score will decide whether the given files are similar or different.

4.5 Flow of the graph technique
Figure 6 shows the flow of the graph technique implementation. Combinations of any
two files from the following sets will become inputs to the program. A simple text file
containing more frequent instructions will be used to initialize the matrix. Then the
program creates matrices for both the files. Those matrices are sent as an input to another
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module which calculates the similarity score. This score is then used to classify whether
the files are similar or different.

Create matrix
using
instruction
traces

CYGWIN
files

IDAN
metamorphic
virus files

Calculate
similarity score

Provide basic
instruction set
Classification
unit

IDAV other
virus files

Graph technique
Similar / different
Figure 6: Flow of the graph technique

5. Similarity score calculation and analysis
5.1 Data collection
Three different sets are used to test our graph technique. First set has 200 IDAN virus
files which belong to one metamorphic virus family. Second set consists of 41 benign
files which are nothing but CYGWIN files [13]. Third set contains 25 different virus
files. These files do not belong to any family. All these sets were created in [6] to analyze
HMM based detection technique.
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As per results in [6], metamorphic viruses can be detected using HMM based detection
technique. But according to [7], this technique can be defeated by few morphing
techniques like dead code insertion, junk code insertion, and instruction substitution
methods. According to [7], 30% subroutine code insertion similar to dead code insertion
evades metamorphic virus detection. Percentage of the subroutine code inserted is
calculated as per the total number of instructions present in subroutines of a file.

There are two considerations in choosing this dataset. First consideration is we want to
compare this technique with HMM based detection technique [6]. For this we will have
to use the same dataset, to adequately compare these two techniques. Second
consideration, as discussed in subsection 3.3, is NGVCK metamorphic viruses have
already been tested for variation in their structures of all generations [6].
Our aim is to check if our graph technique works for simple metamorphic virus detection,
then next step would be to check if it can be defeated by a morphing engine implemented
in [7].

5.2 Test cases
Our program compares two files to find their similarity score. This graph technique is
implemented to detect metamorphic viruses. Hence there are four important comparisons
of different files.
a. Metamorphic virus versus metamorphic virus
b. Normal file versus normal file
c. Benign file versus metamorphic virus file
d. Benign file versus other viruses
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5.2.1 Metamorphic virus versus metamorphic virus
In this combination, we are comparing two metamorphic virus files from the same family
(IDAN). We have 200 IDAN metamorphic virus files created using NGVCK. After
comparing one metamorphic virus file with another metamorphic virus file, we got
around 100 scores.

Figure 7: Similarity scores of metamorphic virus files
Figure 7 shows 100 similarity scores between 200 metamorphic viruses. It shows 0.173
as minimum and 0.525 as maximum score for metamorphic virus files (similar files).
In this case, similar file score range is from 0.173 to 0.525.

5.2.2 Normal file versus normal file (benign files)
In this combination, we are comparing two benign (normal) files. We have around 41
benign files representing CYGWIN files. After comparing one CYGWIN file with only
one CYGWIN file, we get around 20 scores.
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Figure 8: Similarity scores for normal files
Maximum similarity score between benign files is 0.468 and minimum similarity score is
0.023. In both the combinations from 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, scores approximately lie in the
range from 0.023 to 0.525.

5.2.3 Benign file versus metamorphic virus
This combination is the most important combination. If our graph technique is able to
find a similarity score outside the above range, then we will be able to distinguish
between metamorphic virus files and benign software files.

For this combination we have 41 instances of benign files and 200 instances of
metamorphic virus files. As this is a one to one comparison, we are using 41 instances of
both the files. Figure 9 shows the graph for 41 metamorphic virus files compared with 41
benign files.
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Figure 9: Similarity score for normal versus metamorphic virus file
Figure 10 shows the similarity score between metamorphic virus file and benign file
ranges from 0.588 to 0.966. Clearly from above three combinations, metamorphic virus
files and benign files are less similar as their scores have higher values as compared to
that of two benign files and two metamorphic virus files.

Maximum score range for similar files (two benign files and two metamorphic virus files)
is 0.525 and minimum score range for different files (one benign versus one metamorphic
virus file) is 0.588. This shows that there is a threshold of 0.063 between similar files and
different files. There are one more combinations which are not very important in this
scenario, but can be useful in further improvements.
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5.2.4 Benign file versus other virus
This combination is also important as the virus we are comparing does not belong to any
family. To see if this graph technique is able to detect that this virus and benign files are
different, we compared virus file with benign file.

We have 41 benign files and 26 virus files which do not belong to any virus family. To
have one to one comparison, we considered 26 virus files and 26 benign files. Figure 10
is the graph created after calculating the scores of 26 virus and benign files.

Figure 10: Graph for normal file versus other viruses
This graph technique also differentiates between normal viruses and normal (benign)
softwares. The range of the similarity score is 0.563 to 0.86. This range is closer to the
third combination (metamorphic virus Vs benign file) range 0.588 to 0.966. This graph
technique distinguishes between a benign file and any malware present in the dataset.
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5.2.5 Combined graph
Figure 11 shows combination of all graphs.

Figure 11: Graph for all types combined
There is a threshold between similar file scores and different file scores. Table 7 shows
minimum scores and maximum scores for all cases explained till now.
Metamorphic files versus metamorphic files
Minimum Score
Similar Files
0.173

Maximum Score
0.525

Benign files versus benign files
Minimum Score
Similar Files
0.023

Maximum Score
0.468

Benign files versus metamorphic files
Minimum Score
Different Files
0.588

Maximum Score
0.966

Benign files versus other viruses
Minimum Score
Maximum Score
Different Files
0.563
0.860
Table 7: Maximum and minimum scores

33

We have compared files with one to one mapping. But now we will compare one file
with all other files using many to many mapping.

5.3 Comparing 10 benign files with 10 metamorphic files
For this combination, we are taking 10 benign files and 10 metamorphic virus files. We
will get 100 different observations from many to many comparisons. Figure 12 shows
graph of 100 scores for 20 different file combinations. In figure 12, match case is grayed
out as those records are temporarily disabled to show only non-match case. Figure 15
shows the complete graph.

Figure 12: Showing graph for normal file versus metamorphic virus file
Minimum score here is 0.555 and maximum score is 0.933. Score 0.555 is greater than
0.525 which is the maximum score for similar files. Graph technique easily identifies
different file or similar file.
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5.3.1 Average score calculation
If we take the average of 10 scores for a particular file compared with different type of
files, we can surely differentiate between metamorphic virus files and benign files using
this graph technique. We took average of each benign file by adding all ten scores and
dividing it by 10. It can be seen in figure 13.

Figure 13: Graph plotted after average score calculations
In figure 13 minimum average score is 0.6464 and maximum average score is 0.844.
Minimum average score is larger than threshold 0.525. Before taking average, minimum
score was 0.555 which was closer to threshold 0.525 as compared to the minimum
average score of 0.6464. It gives confirmed results of similarity or differentiation.
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5.4 Comparing 10 metamorphic virus files
Mapping for this comparison will be many to many. Any two metamorphic virus files
compared with each other using this graph technique will give the same score even if
order of the files is changed. So here we will get 45 distinct scores from many to many
mapping of 10 virus files. Figure 14 shows the graph with non-match case disabled
(grayed out). Figure 15 shows the complete graph.

Figure 14: Metamorphic virus versus metamorphic virus
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Figure 15: Graph showing match and non-match case together
Figure 15 shows both match case versus non-match case. There is a threshold of 0.06
between match case and non-match case. No false positives or false negatives were
found.

But now there is a need to check if the formula is effective for metamorphic virus
detection. To test its strength, we made some changes in parameters of the formula and
calculated the scores with one to one mapping between a set of 41 benign files and
metamorphic virus files and another set of 100 metamorphic virus files.

5.5 Parameter variations in the formula
5.5.1 First variation
Now we need to test formula for its strength. In the first variation, we took the square of
the difference and then went on adding it to the cumulative sum.
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2

i = N −1 j = N −1
1
Difference = 2 * ( ∑ ( ∑ aij − bij ))
N
i =0
j =0

Equation 2: Squaring the difference and taking the summation
This change in the formula is tested against the same dataset. After calculating score
using this changed formula, graph in figure 16 was plotted. Normal file option is disabled
for time being.

Figure 16: Result of first variation for match case
The scores for similar files are ranging from 0.003 to 0.007. Scores for different files are
shown in figure 17.
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Figure 17: Result of first variation for non-match case
Scores are ranging from 0.0054 to 0.0085.

Similar Files
Different Files

Minimum Score
0.003
0.0054

Maximum Score
0.007
0.0085

Table 8: First variation scores

False Positives
False Negatives

Threshold = 0.006
2
17

Table 9: First variation - false positives and negatives
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Figure 18: Result of first variation
In figure 18, scores are overlapping for different and similar files. This formula change is
not much effective, as there are many false negatives though less false positives.

5.5.2 Second variation
In this variation, we are keeping the above change as it is but removing n2 from it. As n is
the total number of distinct instructions present in both the files, it might not affect much
in similarity score.

Difference = (

i = N −1 j = N −1

∑(∑
i=0

2

aij − bij ))

j =0

Equation 3: Removed n2 from Equation 2
After removing n2 from the formula, we got figure 21 for similar and different files.
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Figure 19: Result of second variation

Similar Files
Different Files

Minimum Score
10.241
25.159

Maximum Score
26.072
48.695

Table 10: Second variation scores

False Positives
False Negatives

Threshold = 25
0
2

Table 11: Second variation - false positives and negatives
Figure 18 and figure 19 show that this formula also works but not as accurate as the
formula in equation 1, that is, no threshold to differentiate between similar or different
files but very less false positives and negatives.
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5.5.3 Third variation
In this change, we are removing n2 from Equation 1. For every score calculation, we are
dividing by the square of the total number of distinct instructions present in both the files.
The value of n is approximately similar in all the cases. The score might not get affected
due to removal of the n2 term.

Difference = (

i = N −1 j = N −1

∑(∑
i=0

aij − bij ) ) 2

j =0

Equation 4: Removing n2 from Equation 1

Figure 20: Result of third variation
The only difference is that values are in thousands range with a separation of 146 and no
false positives or false negatives.
Minimum Score Maximum Score
Similar Files
585.056
2084.291
Different Files 2230.528
6783.549
Table 12: Third variation score
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5.5.4 Fourth variation
Till now we have seen that value of n2 does not affect much. Another small change could
be removing n2 and only keeping n which is nothing but total number of distinct
instructions present in both the files.

1 i = N −1 j = N −1
Difference = * ( ∑ ( ∑ aij − bij ) ) 2
N
i =0
j =0
Equation 5: Keeping only n in Equation 1

Figure 21: Result of fourth variation

Similar Files
Different Files

Minimum Score
10.087
37.659

Maximum Score
33.083
77.971

Table 13: Fourth variation score
No false positives or false negatives appeared in figure 21 with threshold of 4.576.
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5.5.5 Fifth variation
In this variation, the term n2 is kept constant as (110)2 and graph is plotted in figure 22.
i = N −1 j = N −1
1
Difference =
* ( ∑ ( ∑ aij − bij ) ) 2
2
(110 )
i =0
j =0

Equation 6: Replaced N2 with (110)2 in Equation 1

Figure 22: Result of fifth variation
Though there are no false positives or negatives present, threshold 0.012 is not larger
enough. This proves that Equation 1 is more effective.

Similar Files
Different Files

Minimum Score
0.048
0.184

Maximum Score
0.172
0.56

Table 14: Fifth variation score
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6. Observations
From all above test cases, we observed that the graph technique differentiates between
metamorphic virus files and benign files.

Graph technique was tested against many types of files. The similarity score distinguishes
between similar and non-similar files. When two virus files not belonging to any virus
family are compared, results show that their score fall in similarity range. When two
metamorphic virus files from the same family are compared, again the score falls in the
similarity range. When two benign files are compared against each other, score classifies
them as similar files.

But when a benign file is compared against a simple virus or metamorphic virus, results
immediately show that it belongs to different score range. When this score calculation is
computed using variations in the formula, all figures from section 5.5 show that formula
in equation 1 fits the best as compared to other variations.
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Figure 23: Equation 1 results for both the cases

Parameter Variations
Without variation
First variation
Second variation
Third variation
Fourth variation
Fifth variation

Threshold
0.063
NA
NA
146
4.576
0.012

False Positives
0
2
0
0
0
0

False Negatives
0
17
2
0
0
0

Score range
0.173 – 0.966
0.003 – 0.0085
10.241 – 48.695
585.056 – 6783.549
10.087 – 77.971
0.048 – 0.56

Table 15: Comparison between parameter variations
To check which variation was the most effective, all score ranges are normalized.
Parameter variation 1 and 2 are removed from the comparison as there is no clear
threshold between similar and different files. Table 16 shows all threshold values.
Parameter variation
Without variation
Third variation / 10000
Fourth variation / 100
Fifth variation

Threshold
0.0630
0.0146
0.0457
0.0120

False Positives
0
0
0
0

False Negatives
0
0
0
0

Score range
0.173 – 0.966
0.0585 – 0.6783
0.1008 – 0.7797
0.048 – 0.56

Table 16: Comparison between normalized parameter variations
In equation 1, threshold is higher as compared to other variations.
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7. Analysis of graph technique
Following are the key features of this technique.
•

Common instruction is present in both the files. Range of total difference for a
common instruction (row) is 0 to 2.

•

The sparse matrix is normalized to make it a row stochastic matrix. This
normalization helps in calculating the probability of similarity. If the matrix is not
normalized, then this technique can be attacked by increasing the number of
instructions using dead or junk code insertions.

•

If an instruction is present in one file but not in the other file, then it is a distinct
instruction. The difference of rows representing distinct instructions is one.

Due to all the above features, detection rate of the graph technique is close to 100%.
HMM virus detection technique [6] was also successful in detecting NGVCK
metamorphic virus files. But HMM detection technique failed when morphing engine
implemented in [7] was used to morph metamorphic virus copies by inserting 30% of
dead and junk code.

Next step in this project is to create an attack on this graph technique by compromising
its features and by using morphing engine from [7] to morph metamorphic virus files.
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8. Attacks on the graph technique
A metamorphic virus file may contain some instructions which are uncommon (not
present) in benign files. If we try to replace or remove those instructions to make
metamorphic virus file look like a benign file, then test that virus file against a benign
file. This might give us score which falls in the similar score range. Removing such
instructions will also lower the score.

8.1 Removing distinct instructions
Distinct instructions which are not present in benign file but present in virus file are
removed from the virus file to make it look like a normal file. Almost 80% of distinct
instructions are removed from a virus file, and scores are calculated. Figure 24 shows the
different file scores before and after the attack.

Figure 24: Graph for different files after instruction removal attack
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Minimum Score Maximum Score
Score before the attack 0.588
0.966
Score after the attack
0.511
0.94
Table 17: Different file scores
Minimum score fell below the threshold for different files. There is one false negative.

False Positives
False Negatives

Threshold = 0.5
0
1

Table 18: Number of false positives / negatives after the attack

From table 18 it is clear that, this attack is able to remove the threshold but it is not
successful in defeating the virus detection.

Figure 25: Graph to compare similar and different files after attack
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8.2 Using a morphing engine
8.2.1 Morphing engine based on subroutine code insertion and
instruction substitution
In [7], morph engine results are really good in terms of junk and subroutine code
insertions. Dead instructions are a set of instructions which are intentionally kept at a
place where control never comes and those instructions will not be executed. False loop
condition is never true and control does not enter in the loop through out the execution.
When dead instructions are placed into the code segment, they do not get executed due to
a new jump or a false loop condition. In [7], junk code insertion denotes dead instructions
added in between a code segment. Before the dead instructions, a new jump instruction is
added which points to the original code and avoids dead code execution. There is one
more type of dead code insertion which is subroutine code insertion. A function in the
morphing engine copies subroutines from normal file and pastes it into the virus copy to
make it look similar to the normal file. As this subroutine is not called anywhere in the
virus file, it becomes a dead code. Instruction substitution though not carried out on a
higher percentage, morphs the virus copy. Instruction substitution is not of much
importance here as it constitutes to 2-3% of the complete code.

Here we have two major cases, junk code insertion and subroutine insertion. After
modifying the morphing engine in [7] to satisfy current requirements, scores for 30% and
40% morphing are calculated and following is a 30% morphed graph.
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Figure 26: 30% subroutine code inserted in metamorphic virus files
In figure 26, similar file scores are getting merged with different file scores at some
extent. Almost 4 files fall into false positive range. Similarly figure 27 is a graph for 40%
subroutine code insertion case. It seems that this attack performs better than instructions
removal attack.

Figure 27: 40% subroutine code inserted in metamorphic virus files
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8.2.1.1 Comparing HMM and graph based detection
We will compare these results with the results stated in [7]. Figure 28 shows the result for
30% subroutine code insertion tested against HMM based detection technique.
Minimum score Maximum score
Similar Files
0.173
0.525
Different Files
0.428
0.926
Table 19: Scores for graph based technique
False Positive False Negative
4

0

Table 20: False positives / negatives in graph based technique
Table 19 and 20 shows results of our graph technique for morphed metamorphic viruses.

False Positives

False Negatives

35

36

Table 21: HMM based detection results with 30% subroutine insertion
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Figure 28: HMM based detection results with 30% subroutines copied [7]
Table 21 and Figure 28 show that HMM virus detection technique was failing for 30%
subroutine copying from normal file. But our graph technique works much better as
compared to HMM based detection technique. Graph based detection technique has 4
false positives. In [7], HMM based detection failed for 30% subroutine code with 36 false
negatives and 35 false positives. This way, second attack is also failing to break our
graph technique and to evade virus detection.

8.2.2 Morphing engine based on block dead code insertion
In the block morphing, we are capturing a random block from benign file and appending
that code into metamorphic virus. The size of the block depends upon the inputs such as
percentage of morphing, virus and benign files, and the file sizes. First we need to count
the total number of lines present in the virus file. To count the number of lines, we parse
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the whole virus file ignoring comments, variable declarations, and blank lines. Then
according to the given percentage input we calculate the total number of lines to be
copied. Percentage value ranges from 0 to 1. For example, if the percentage value entered
is x and total number of actual instruction lines is n, then total number of lines to be
copied from benign file is n * x. If n is 700 and x is 0.2 then total number of lines copied
from a benign file is 140. After appending the chunk of code in the metamorphic virus
file, we calculate the similarity score for the metamorphic virus file as well as the benign
file from which the chunk of code is copied. Figure 29 shows scores for all 40 morphed
metamorphic viruses scored against 40 benign files for percentages ranging from 0.1 to 1.

Figure 29: Scores for block morphed metamorphic viruses
There is huge drop in scores for different kind of files. For 100% of morphing, the score
is below the threshold of 0.525. Till 30%, scores are not affected much. There are only 4
false positives and 6 false negatives as shown in figure 30.
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Figure 30: Metamorphic and benign versus morphed metamorphic virus
These scores are calculated when a morphed metamorphic virus is compared with the
benign file from which the chunk of code is copied. Hence these two files look similar as
we increase the percentage. Figure 31 shows a graph where metamorphic virus file is
compared with the benign file from which the code is not copied.

Figure 31: Metamorphic versus other benign

55

In figure 31, most of the scores are above the threshold of 0.5. It shows that even if the
metamorphic virus file is morphed using benign code, it still can be detected using this
graph technique.
8.2.2.1 Comparing HMM and graph based detection for block morphing
For this comparison, we have calculated scores individually for all block morphed copies
of metamorphic virus files and benign files. To calculate HMM scores we used the HMM
detector from [6]. Around 800 scores were calculated for benign files and metamorphic
virus files for all percentage cases. Figure 32 shows 30% block morphed scores for
metamorphic virus files and benign files.

Figure 32: HMM - 30% block morphed scores
In figure 32, there are many false positives and false negatives.
Minimum score Maximum score
Morphed Metamorphic files
-2.620
-43.488
Benign files
-3.437
-31.602
Table 22: HMM - Minimum and maximum scores

56

From table 22, it is clear that all benign file scores lie inside the range of morphed
metamorphic virus file scores. HMM is not able to distinguish between virus and benign
files as there is no clear threshold to distinguish. If we consider a particular threshold of
say -3.800 where > -3.800 are metamorphic virus files and < -3.800 are benign files, then
values of false positives and false negatives are calculated as shown in table 23.
False Positive False Negative
1

9

Table 23: HMM - 30% false scores
Values of false positives and false negatives depend upon the threshold. If we increase or
decrease the particular threshold then false scores are affected. Table 24 shows the false
scores for 100% block morphing.

Figure 33: HMM - 100% block morphed results
Here if we consider threshold of -5.000 then table 24 shows the counts of false positives
and false negatives.
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False Positive False Negative
11

3

Table 24: HMM - 100% false scores
From above figures and tables, it is clear that block morphing is not able to completely
evade HMM based metamorphic virus detection. When we compare HMM based
detection with graph based detection against block morphing engine, graph based
detection is definitely more accurate than HMM as the numbers of false positives and
false negatives are very less in case of graph based detection.

8.2.3 Morphing engine based on random dead code insertion
In the random morphing, we are capturing a random block from benign file and evenly
distributing the whole chunk of instructions into metamorphic virus. The size of the
chunk depends upon the inputs such as percentage of morphing, virus and benign files,
and the file sizes. It is similar to block morphing in calculating the total number of lines
present in the virus file. Then according to the given percentage input we calculate the
total number of lines to be copied. Percentage calculation is also similar to block
morphing. Main difference between these two morphing engines is how the metamorphic
virus file morphed using the code copied from benign file. In random morphing, the
copied code is evenly distributed through out the metamorphic virus file depending upon
a factor “after_lines”. Value of “after_lines” is calculated by dividing length of the virus
file with total number of lines to be copied. For example if the morphing percentage is
100% then each statement from the chunk of code is inserted after each instruction in the
virus file. Hence total number of lines in both the morphing engines will be same
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according to the percentage value. Figure 34 shows scores for all 40 randomly morphed
metamorphic viruses scored against 40 benign files for percentages ranging from 0.1 to 1.

Figure 34: Randomly morphed metamorphic viruses versus benign files
Random morphing did not remove the threshold between similar and different files, and
instead improved the similarity score between different types of files. Here the score for
all percentages is higher than 0.5. Hence this technique is able to distinguish between
morphed metamorphic virus files and benign files.

8.2.3.1 Comparing HMM and graph based detection for random morphing
For this comparison, we have calculated scores individually for all random morphed
copies of metamorphic virus files and benign files. Around 800 scores were calculated for
benign files and metamorphic virus files for all percentage cases. Figure 35 shows 30%
random morphed scores for metamorphic virus files and benign files.
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Figure 35: HMM - 30% random morphed results
If we consider a threshold of -5.0 and > -5.0 are metamorphic viruses and < -5.0 are
benign files, then table 25 shows false score statistics.
False Positive False Negative
11

5

Table 25: HMM - 30% false scores
Figure 36 shows score ranges for 100% randomly morphed metamorphic virus copies and
benign files.
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Figure 36: HMM - 100% random morphed results
If we consider a threshold of -5.000 then table 26 shows false scores.

False Positive False Negative
11

5

Table 26: HMM - 30% false scores
In random morphing, the total count of false positives and false negatives is larger than
that of block morphing. Random morphing is more effective than block morphing in
evading the HMM based metamorphic virus detection.

8.3 Reason behind all morphing results for graph based
detection
In block morphing, the whole chunk is copied. That means the count of successive
instructions is moving towards equality. It results in morphed metamorphic virus file to
look like benign file from which the code is copied. But score between two similar files
also has some non-zero value. So if another benign file is compared with the morphed
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metamorphic virus file, then the score is still high which shows both the files are
different. Figure 37 gives detailed information.

Normal1.txt
MOV
ADD
SUB

Less
different

Virus1.txt
Different PUSH
JZ
INT

Bmorph_virus1.txt
PUSH
JZ
INT
MOV
ADD
SUB

Normal2.txt
MOV
ADD
JNZ
SUB

More different

Figure 37: Block morph example
In random morphing, the overall chunk is scattered in the whole metamorphic virus file.
This distribution is even and statements are inserted after particular number of lines. If
there is increase in the count of successive instructions, then the score will also increase.
And due to new insertions of statements the count for those successive instructions will
increase. Figure 38 shows detailed information.
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Normal1.txt
MOV
ADD
SUB

Virus1.txt
Different PUSH
JZ
INT

Normal2.txt
MOV
ADD
JNZ
SUB

Morphed

More different

Bmorph_virus1.txt
PUSH
MOV
JZ
ADD
INT
SUB

More different

Figure 38: Random morph example
Whenever there is increment in the count of successive instructions, score will increase.
If the score is high, that means both the files are much different in appearance or nature.
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9. Conclusion
Graph based detection technique distinguishes between viruses, benign files,
metamorphic viruses, and randomly morphed metamorphic viruses. There is a threshold
to distinguish between similar and different files with no false negatives or false
positives. Graph based detection technique results show 100% detection with zero error
rates.

Similar and different file scores are affected due to variations in the formula. First
variation lowered the accuracy of the technique with 17 false negatives and 2 false
positives. Second variation showed better results as compared to first variation. It has
only two false negatives. Third and fourth variations show a separation between similar
and different types of files but the threshold value is small. Third and fourth variations
have less impact on the results of the graph based detection technique. From the
normalized score, equation 1 is the most effective formula with maximum threshold.

In total, four attacks are carried out on graph based detection technique. First attack is
instruction removal attack. This attack is not much effective in defeating the graph based
virus detection as there is only one false positive. Second attack is to morph metamorphic
viruses using a morphing engine based on subroutine insertion and instruction
substitution to evade virus detection by graph based detection technique. This attack not
only removed the threshold, but also created false alarms. There are 4 false positives due
to the second attack. Second attack shows good results as compared to first attack. Graph
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based detection results in second attack are compared with HMM based virus detection
scores for morphed metamorphic viruses.

For 30% of the subroutine code insertion, HMM based detection was showing 36 false
negatives and 35 false positives for 40 benign files and 40 metamorphic viruses. In graph
based detection technique only 4 false positives and no false negatives are observed for
40 benign files and 40 metamorphic virus files. Though 4 benign files are caught as a
virus, metamorphic virus detection is 100%.

For third and fourth attack, we created our own morphing engines to test graph based
detection and HMM based detection. In the third attack, the morphing engine appends the
virus file with a chunk of code copied from benign file. In block morphing, the graph
based technique failed to detect all virus and benign files after 70% of morphing. But
when the morphed copies were compared against other benign files from where the code
is not copied, then the graph based technique was much effective in differentiating
between morphed metamorphic virus files and benign files till 100% morphing. There
were 3 false positives in 100% block morphing when compared with other benign file
from which the code is not copied to morph the metamorphic virus file.

In fourth attack, morphing engine is inserting each statement from the chunk of code
copied from benign file, into virus file at a particular interval. This in effect increases the
count of successive instructions. So the similarity score between randomly morphed
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metamorphic virus and benign virus file is increased, which shows that both these files
are much different.

Graph based detection technique proved to be better in detecting metamorphic viruses as
compared to HMM based virus detection technique. For graph based detection technique,
the numbers of false positives and false negatives are very less as compared to HMM
based virus detection technique.
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10. Future work
Currently graph based detection technique is detecting NGVCK metamorphic viruses
from IDAN family. We used an existing set of benign files, metamorphic virus files and
other virus files. This set is limited in terms of file counts for viruses and benign
software. Going forward, it would be useful if larger number of files is tested against this
graph based detection technique. Every year millions of new malware are created [41].
So with larger data sets, it would be beneficial to consider more recent list of malware.

In this paper, we concentrated on metamorphic viruses as they are the most difficult
viruses to detect. This view can be broadened to other types of viruses like polymorphic
virus, macro virus, resident virus etc.

Any detection technique does not detect all types of malware. Another improvement
would be to incorporate this graph based detection technique with other effective
malware detection techniques to detect malware. This might prove to be effective and
accurate.
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Appendix A: More frequent assembly instructions [21]
Instructions
push
mov
cmp
jne
clc
xor
adc
inc
loop
Jc
jmp
pop
leave
ret
sbb
jnc
enter
fld
fcomip
jna
fcomp
pusha
call
add
popa
Je

Use
Push data onto stack
Move data from one place to another
Compare operands
Jump if not equals
Clear the carry flag
Exclusive OR
Add with Carry
Increment by 1
Loop control
Jump on carry
Simply jump to the location
Pop data from stack
Leave stack frame
Return from procedure
Subtraction with Borrow
Jump if no carry
Enter stack frame
Floating point load
Compare
Jump if condition
Compare and pop
Push all general purpose registers onto
stack
Call procedure
Addition
Pop all general purpose registers from stack
Jump if equals
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Appendix B: Additional scores and graphs

Figure 39: Graph with all comparisons
Benign files versus benign files
File 1
IDAR0.asm
IDAR2.asm
IDAR4.asm
IDAR6.asm
IDAR8.asm
IDAR10.asm
IDAR12.asm
IDAR14.asm
IDAR16.asm
IDAR18.asm
IDAR20.asm
IDAR22.asm
IDAR24.asm
IDAR26.asm
IDAR28.asm
IDAR30.asm
IDAR32.asm
IDAR34.asm
IDAR36.asm
IDAR38.asm

File 2
Score
IDAR1.asm
0.227
IDAR3.asm
0.337
IDAR5.asm
0.344
IDAR7.asm
0.023
IDAR9.asm
0.357
IDAR11.asm
0.255
IDAR13.asm
0.246
IDAR15.asm
0.468
IDAR17.asm
0.14
IDAR19.asm
0.138
IDAR21.asm
0.326
IDAR23.asm
0.431
IDAR25.asm
0.316
IDAR27.asm
0.289
IDAR29.asm
0.112
IDAR31.asm
0.231
IDAR33.asm
0.454
IDAR35.asm
0.431
IDAR37.asm
0.191
IDAR39.asm
0.424

74

Family of Metamorphic Viruses
File 1
File 2
Score
IDAN0.asm IDAN1.asm 0.395
IDAN2.asm IDAN3.asm 0.354
IDAN4.asm IDAN5.asm 0.437
IDAN6.asm IDAN7.asm 0.384
IDAN8.asm IDAN9.asm 0.327
IDAN10.asm IDAN11.asm 0.29
IDAN12.asm IDAN13.asm 0.293
IDAN14.asm IDAN15.asm 0.173
IDAN16.asm IDAN17.asm 0.214
IDAN18.asm IDAN19.asm 0.419
IDAN20.asm IDAN21.asm 0.283
IDAN22.asm IDAN23.asm 0.335
IDAN24.asm IDAN25.asm 0.339
IDAN26.asm IDAN27.asm 0.331
IDAN28.asm IDAN29.asm 0.406
IDAN30.asm IDAN31.asm 0.525
IDAN32.asm IDAN33.asm 0.235
IDAN34.asm IDAN35.asm 0.409
IDAN36.asm IDAN37.asm 0.298
IDAN38.asm IDAN39.asm 0.272
IDAN40.asm IDAN41.asm 0.414
IDAN42.asm IDAN43.asm 0.247
IDAN44.asm IDAN45.asm 0.287
IDAN46.asm IDAN47.asm 0.332
IDAN48.asm IDAN49.asm 0.286
IDAN50.asm IDAN51.asm 0.333
IDAN52.asm IDAN53.asm 0.298
IDAN54.asm IDAN55.asm 0.218
IDAN56.asm IDAN57.asm 0.291
IDAN58.asm IDAN59.asm 0.357
Other viruses
File 1
File 2
IDAV0.asm
IDAV2.asm
IDAV4.asm
IDAV6.asm
IDAV8.asm
IDAV10.asm
IDAV12.asm
IDAV14.asm
IDAV16.asm
IDAV18.asm
IDAV20.asm

IDAV1.asm
IDAV3.asm
IDAV5.asm
IDAV7.asm
IDAV9.asm
IDAV11.asm
IDAV13.asm
IDAV15.asm
IDAV17.asm
IDAV19.asm
IDAV21.asm

Score
0.007
0.016
0.012
0.003
0.023
0.245
0.236
0.264
0.333
0.211
0.174
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Benign files versus metamorphic virus files
File 1
IDAR0.asm
IDAR1.asm
IDAR2.asm
IDAR3.asm
IDAR4.asm
IDAR5.asm
IDAR6.asm
IDAR7.asm
IDAR8.asm
IDAR9.asm
IDAR10.asm
IDAR11.asm
IDAR12.asm
IDAR13.asm
IDAR14.asm
IDAR15.asm
IDAR16.asm
IDAR17.asm
IDAR18.asm
IDAR19.asm
IDAR20.asm
IDAR21.asm
IDAR22.asm
IDAR23.asm
IDAR24.asm
IDAR25.asm
IDAR26.asm
IDAR27.asm
IDAR28.asm
IDAR29.asm
IDAR30.asm
IDAR31.asm
IDAR32.asm
IDAR33.asm
IDAR34.asm
IDAR35.asm
IDAR36.asm
IDAR37.asm
IDAR38.asm
IDAR39.asm
IDAR40.asm

File 2
IDAN0.asm
IDAN1.asm
IDAN2.asm
IDAN3.asm
IDAN4.asm
IDAN5.asm
IDAN6.asm
IDAN7.asm
IDAN8.asm
IDAN9.asm
IDAN10.asm
IDAN11.asm
IDAN12.asm
IDAN13.asm
IDAN14.asm
IDAN15.asm
IDAN16.asm
IDAN17.asm
IDAN18.asm
IDAN19.asm
IDAN20.asm
IDAN21.asm
IDAN22.asm
IDAN23.asm
IDAN24.asm
IDAN25.asm
IDAN26.asm
IDAN27.asm
IDAN28.asm
IDAN29.asm
IDAN30.asm
IDAN31.asm
IDAN32.asm
IDAN33.asm
IDAN34.asm
IDAN35.asm
IDAN36.asm
IDAN37.asm
IDAN38.asm
IDAN39.asm
IDAN40.asm

Score
0.702
0.738
0.933
0.706
0.82
0.675
0.782
0.588
0.635
0.761
0.701
0.677
0.722
0.666
0.856
0.714
0.615
0.64
0.632
0.7
0.725
0.7
0.705
0.66
0.881
0.803
0.746
0.663
0.632
0.695
0.77
0.759
0.643
0.725
0.966
0.806
0.705
0.783
0.896
0.79
0.912
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Figure 40: 30% junk code inserted

Figure 41: 30% dead code inserted
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Figure 42: 40% dead code inserted

Figure 43: 40% junk code inserted
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Figure 44: Consolidated block morph HMM results for metamorphic viruses

Figure 45: Consolidated block morph HMM results for benign files
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Figure 46: Consolidated random morph HMM results for metamorphic viruses

Figure 47: Consolidated random morph HMM results for benign files
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